

Critical Observation
on
The Washington Conference

By

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PREFACE

When the Conference opened I was filled with enthusiasm by President Harding's speech which was high and lofty in ideals, and rich and resourceful in concrete and practical suggestions. Then, I observed the progress of the Conference with care and interest till the newspapers in general commenced to accuse Japan because she did not accept the Hughes proposal without modifications. Thereupon, I availed myself of every opportunity to answer those accusations. This was done, to my mind with utmost fairness and justice. I distributed them from time to time to the leading newspapers and the prominent figures in the Conference. Here, I have compiled them, in order to show the result of my toil to those who love truth and justice for the sake of peace and humanity!

S. K.

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CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| I. The Naval Ratio and American Navalism | 5 |
| Naval Limitation and International Injustice. | |
| Erroneous Opinion of Americans. | |
| Comment on the Just Approval of Americans. | |
| Arbitrary Measurement of Naval Strength. | |
| Demand for Justice on Naval Ratio. | |
| The Ratio 5-5-3 is Fundamentally Wrong. | |
| No Sacrifice but a Great Benefit to the United States. | |
| American Navalism. | |
| II. The Submarine Question and the British Attitude.. | 12 |
| Careful Study of British Logic on the Submarine Question. | |
| Abandonment of Capital ships or Submarines ? | |
| English Selfishness. | |
| III. Unjustified Accusation | 14 |
| Who is Responsible for the Failure of the Conference ? | |
| False Challenge. | |
| IV. The Four Power Pact and the League of Nations .. | 15 |
| V. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance | 16 |
| Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its Service to Humanity. | |
| The Test of Anglo-Japanese Friendship. | |
| Evolutionist or Militarist? | |
| VI. The Chemical Warfare Question | 18 |
| Attitude of American Militarists on Chemical Warfare. | |
| The View of the Japanese Delegation Relating to the use of Poison Gases. | |
| VII. The Illegality of the Neutrality of China | 22 |
| VIII. The Washington Conference and the Panama Canal Zone | 23 |
| IX. The Washington Conference and Bernhardism | 24 |
| X. The Naval Holiday a Joke | 26 |
| XI. Root's Four Points and their Absurdity | 26 |
| XII. The "Open Diplomacy" of the American Delegates.. | 27 |
| XIII. No Pan-Asiatic Doctrine | 28 |
| XIV. Agreement and Threat | 29 |
| XV. Leased Territory and the Misunderstanding of the United States | 29 |
| Appendix | 31 |

The Naval Ratio and American Navalism

NAVAL LIMITATION AND INTERNATIONAL INJUSTICE

The most of American newspapers state that the formula 5-5-3 proposed by Mr. Hughes is the unalterable ratio. They claim it is calculated as a basis from the existing strength of three naval powers. It is to avoid ruinous competition in naval construction. Therefore, the proposed ratio permits no modification.

To the American mind the above argument seems plausible, but it is not convincing nor just from the Japanese viewpoint. Let us examine the ratio of naval strength given by an American paper:

The Washington *Evening Star* of November 12, 1921 states the comparative fighting strengths, giving number of ships and tonnage, and they are as follows:

Great Britain, 533 ships, 1,860,480 tons; United States, 464 ships, 1,289,463; etc.

(See the statistics compiled by different countries)

If the formula, 5-3 between Japan and the United States is to eliminate competition, and if the formula is a just one inasmuch as it is based upon the existing naval strength, then, why does not the United States apply the same measurement between the navies of Great Britain and the United States? Are they actually 5-5; that is, are their strengths absolutely equal? If the United States has the freedom of assuming for her navy absolute equality with the British when these navies are not equal in reality, then, Japan should be considered under the same rule. There should be impartiality. That is to say, Japan too, has the right of assuming for her navy equality with that of Great Britain and of the United States.

But when the United States insists on maintaining the existing ratio between Japan and the United States, she neglects to apply the same principle as to Great Britain. The Japanese cannot but think it is merely an arbitrary formula fixed in favor of the United States, inasmuch as the navy of the United States is not equal to that of Great Britain.

The Japanese delegates, from the beginning expressed their willingness to accept the proposal "in principle" but with a definite reservation that "certain modifications will be proposed with regard to the tonnage basis." It is not a mere declaration. It shows clearly the sincerity of the Japanese people. It also shows that they approached to that point with true conception and moderate attitude.

The Japanese firmly believe in the equality of nations under the accepted principles of international law. Yet the Japanese delegates do not dare to uphold the principle of equality in naval strength; for the Japanese as a race are very conciliatory in daily life; and that is true in international affairs as well. Moreover, they love peace, and have never attempted to maintain as great an aggressive power as two nations do.* At the same time they do not wish to accept blindly the formula—arbitrary, dictatorial sentence or dogma—merely proclaimed by the American delegates.

The delegates from the United States try to limit the right of advancing the Japanese argument because of the expression, "accept in principle," when Japan's national security is at stake. These delegates will understand that the Japanese people are wide-awake in political affairs—and the spirit of democracy is holding the upper hand. They will never endure to sacrifice the national security because of a single utterance in English by one of the Japanese.

The United States stands for "equal opportunity" in China. She claims a naval equality with Great Britain. Would it not be fair to give equality to Japan in naval affairs? But the Japanese delegates did not insist upon equality in navies. Their demand is only for 7, to 10 for the United States. The United States should be more than willing to grant it, for most of the Japanese at home are demanding this ratio.

It needs to be emphasized that if the Conference fails to attain success, it will not be due to the Japanese. The delegates from the United States should be reminded of President Harding's opening address to the Conference in which he "welcomed the delegates with unselfish hands," and said: "The world demands a sober contemplation of the existing order

*See American Navalism, p. 11.

and the realization that there can be no cure without sacrifice, not by one of us but by all of us."

(An article in the Washington Post—see Appendix, 4—can by good reason be considered as the reply to the present article.)

ERRONEOUS OPINION OF AMERICANS

There appeared a very interesting article in the *Washington Post* of November 25th.* We must, however, point out some fallacy contained in it to correct the wrong impression likely to be made upon the American mind concerning the ratio 5-5-3 in navies.

1. If the geographical area is one of the controlling factors in consideration, then, it must be remembered that the territories of the United States are not equal in extent to those of Great Britain. Neither are Japan and the United States equal in respect of the extent of their territories. The three powers are entirely different. In spite of this fact the United States is claiming her equality with Great Britain determined by herself. Is it not then, reasonable to give Japan the right of equality with the two other powers?

2. The wealth of the three nations is also different. But wealth as a standard of measurement for the ratio of naval strength is not admissible, for wealth is subject to change. Japan aspires to be rich, and is gaining in wealth year by year. Again there must be no confusion between "national defence" and the "protection of wealth" by a navy. Does a millionaire need a larger and stronger policeman than a mere wage earner?

3. The volume of foreign trade is not quite the same among the three nations. If, then, the sole purpose of the navy is to protect foreign commerce, why do not Americans advocate an entire scrapping of battleships, retaining cruisers only? (Battleships are regarded as fighting implements.) Some of the Japanese, even before the Conference was opened, advocated this plan. The position of the United States is not clear in this matter. The arguments advanced in the paper are not convincing to us. We still demand more logical explanation and the voice of justice.

(This article was written in reply to the article in the Washington Post.)

*See Appendix, No. 4.

COMMENT ON THE JUST APPROVAL OF THE AMERICANS

The spirit of justice welcomes truth as truth. The spirit of freedom rejects untruth as untruth. The fairness of the attitude of the Americans is well expressed in the *Washington Post* of Nov. 27th which states: "The present existing ratio, according to American calculations, is 5-5-3. If these calculations can be challenged as inaccurate, there may be every right on the part of Japan to do so and accordingly ask for a change in the ratio."

The existing strengths of the navies of England and the United States are not equal. The Americans admit this fact plainly in papers which we believe to be trustworthy.

The calculation of the numerical ratio must be accurate and exact. If logic is responsible for the ratio, it must be consistent all the way through. Accuracy and consistency are characteristics of civilized nations, and are the incarnation of democracy. And reasoning of them is the path of understanding which leads to peace. Thus the voice of justice may be heightened and it shall reign in international affairs.

(This article was written for the *Washington Post* in reply to its article—see Appendix, No. 5.)

ARBITRARY MEASUREMENT OF NAVAL STRENGTH

"The ratio 5-5-3 for the navies of the three powers," says the American (especially the *Washington Post*) "is based upon the existing strength of England, the United States and Japan."

But no matter what nation calculates; no matter what measurement one may use, all come to the same conclusion—that the existing strength between England and the United States the existing strengths of the navies of England and the United States are not equal.

In spite of this undeniable fact, the Americans claim that they have calculated the ratio from the existing strength of the three powers. We, the Japanese, cannot comprehend this claim.

The American claim is made up arbitrarily by the Americans themselves. They have chosen their own standard of

measurement. It may be said that the measuring stick was made of rubber so that when applying it to one it may be stretched and it may be shrunk at will when applying to another. Thus when they calculate the ratio they insist upon the existing strength and assume absolute equality between America and England. This proposal is nothing but arbitrary.

How can any reasonable people agree to this proposal? Fifty-five million Japanese at home will not approve of this unreasonable and artful proposal beneficial to America only. One can easily see the reason why the Japanese do not approve of this plan. Japan has the right to claim absolute equality in international affairs. Yet she does not; she asks only a 7 to 10 ratio relative to the United States.

DEMAND FOR JUSTICE ON NAVAL RATIO

1. The ration 5-5-3 of naval strength should not be confused with the ratio of future strength as calculated by American experts. (Referring to the original naval program of the U. S.) Children cannot be counted as soldiers of today.

2. The existing strengths of the navies of England and the United States are not as 5-5. No matter what nationality calculates, no matter what measurement one may use they are not equal. The fact cannot be ignored.

3. Whether or not England and the United States are in harmony as to this ratio, we have no concern. Yet the United States and England should not endeavor to influence nor to force Japan because of their own agreement.

4. An American propagandist, calling himself a "Neutral Statesman" says the Hughes plan was made public after an agreement had been reached between England and the United States. If so, there should not be any dissent in "principle and in spirit" between the two nations.

5. The principle of equality is an ideal. Italy in regard to France insists upon it for herself. America and England have mutually adopted it. The principle of inequality is not only contrary to international law but affects national honor. This cannot be infringed upon. Japan will agree with the idea of conciliation only when she believes national defence to be adequate. The calculation of national defence must be determined by Japan herself.

6. Japan is not bound to submit to a proposal which ignores facts and which is inconsistent in logic. America should be just, peaceful and honest. Do not forget justice. Do not make Japan excited but make her understand!

THE RATIO 5-5-3 IS FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG

The American experts found some discrepancies in the original calculations. This was admitted by the *Washington Post*.* It said: "Various tabulations were gone over by the experts and in every case Japan's ratio fell below 60 per cent."

If so, what the American delegates have insisted upon during the last three weeks was not fact, though they have continually stated that the ratio 5-5-3 was derived from the "existing strength." It must be emphasized that the "existing strength" between England and the United States has never been equal. No one can find the equality between them, not even the author of the ratio himself.

The foregoing analysis means that the American finding had no base at all. It is an arbitrary claim made by the American delegates to suit themselves. It is a mere declaration of a policy and not the result of a calculation. How can the United States expect Japan to accept it?

NO SACRIFICE, BUT A GREAT BENEFIT TO THE U. S.

The *Washington Post* stated: "The enormous sacrifice the United States government has offered to make, it was stated officially, must be reflected in the fleet ratio to be established with Japan." But, there is no sacrifice on the part of the United States, for as it has been stated in almost all the papers, the aim of the limitation of naval armament is to lighten the burden of the American people; then, the more scrapping of ships, the greater the saving it will be, and it is the logical step to take.

Even though the United States consents to reduce her naval power; yet she tries to maintain a great preponderance over Japan. What a beautiful double-play! The Japanese do not envy the increasing wealth and strength to be gained

*See Appendix, No. 2.

by the United States by curtailing her naval expenditure; the only thing Japan asks from America is Justice and recognition of Japan's reasonable demand!

AMERICAN NAVALISM

The following quotation is from the *Washington Post* of the 22nd of December, 1921: "The view was expressed that the real business of the conference has been accomplished in the limitation of first-line ships since it is that class of war vessels which constitutes the *major element of naval aggression* and which at the same time entails the great bulk of public expenditure." (Italics ours.)

Now let us see what this sentence means? From the viewpoint of a Japanese, the United States appears as if she is very autocratic and selfish. As stated in the *Post*, the battleships—the first-line ships—are the aggressive instruments. Then, the nation that possesses the most of these instruments must logically be the most dangerous one. What nation belongs to this class in the Pacific Ocean? It is the United States of America.

The Conference forced the Japanese delegates to have only a ratio of 3 while the United States favored herself with the high ratio of 5. The Japanese delegates proposed only a little more than 3 with a view of eliminating the fear of naval aggression by another country. But the United States, keeping her own interest in mind and ignoring that of the others, has succeeded in dominating all the other nations.* With this attitude of a fearful despot, the United States placed herself in a safety zone at the expense of other peoples' national security. How can we expect to see contented peace with such an arrangement? The business of the Conference was to accomplish justice and a status of ideal peace; but it developed two dictators coupled with unproportionally strong navies. Is this the ideal of the American nation whose ideal is justice, freedom and equality?

*See Appendix, No. 10.

The Submarine Question and the British Attitude

A CAREFUL STUDY OF BRITISH LOGIC ON THE SUBMARINE QUESTION

The British viewpoint on the submarine question was expressed in the *Washington Post* of December 26th. The statement needs a careful study. It is as follows:

"They [the British] declared that almost any nation that wanted submarines, either wanted them for that particular purpose [the destruction of both enemy and neutral merchant marines] or for a future time when desperation would force them to use them as the Germans had used them."

The above statement may be summarized into two points, viz: (1) Even though some rules and regulations may be established on the legitimate use of submarines, such agreement would be of little effect as long as nations can regard treaties as scraps of paper; and (2) Those who oppose the abolition of submarines are the ones who disregard treaties, and international law.

To cite only one fact of Germany's attitude in regard to a treaty and to try to classify all other nations in that category, is not that insulting the civilized nations? If the argument of the British delegates is accurate, then the stipulation on the limitation of naval armament does not mean anything; then all treaties and international law are likewise meaningless. Is not the argument of British delegates insulting to all the other civilized nations?

ABANDONMENT OF CAPITAL SHIPS OR SUBMARINES

The English delegates declare that "Submarines were not effective against capital ships. They were only effective against merchant marines." This conclusion is too childish. If the Germans had concentrated their efforts against the British capital ships they could have accomplished a great deal

of damage. It was not their aim—Germany aimed at only merchant marines. This was the plan of the famous Tirpitz.

The argument of the English delegates conveys only one side of the truth. If the English reasoning holds true the following statement ought also to be true—"Since the German capital ships surrendered without fighting, there is no utility in capital ships for defence or offence." It follows that England should advocate the total abandonment of capital ships instead of holding a large share of capital ships for herself. And this stand will have better support from other nations.

ENGLISH SELFISHNESS

The opinion of the English delegates on the submarine question was stated in many American newspapers and it states: "The submarine is a valueless weapon of war, offensive and defensive."

If this is the truth, then, England should propose, "*Every nation must prepare sufficient capital ships for its national defence.*" But England obtains a large tonnage of capital ships for herself and on the other hand she insists on limiting the tonnage of other nations—except America—to the lowest point. Can one declare this unselfish on the part of England?

The English delegates claim that during the Great War England protected France and Italy by the British capital ships. Then, why does she not allow France and Italy to have a sufficient amount of capital ships to protect themselves?

From an impartial viewpoint, the arguments advanced by the English delegates are not consistent—they are merely selfish. This kind of behavior—autocratic and selfish—in international as well as in national politics, diminishes the sympathy of others.

III

Unjustified Accusation

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE?

The reason why Japan accepted the invitation for the Conference must be made clear. Japan has sent her delegation to the Conference because she approved the rational idea of the United States—that is, the limitation of naval armament. Japan did not send her delegates to accept blindly an unknown proposal.

Japan has no right to submit to the command of a foreign state—she stands respectfully on the principle of equality. The whole Japanese delegation do not mind staying in Washington no matter how long it may require; and they desire to remain here until they arrive at an amicable understanding with the United States, their intimate friend.

Japan did not come here merely to listen and accept the arbitrary proposals of others; but inasmuch as she accepted the invitation of the United States and came to Washington, she will not leave without accomplishing the hearing by the Americans of her just and reasonable claim. The United States has no right to drive the Japanese, who are advocating to the American nation, what is just, out of Washington. Then, if any one is responsible for the failure of the Conference, it must be the one who ignores the voice of Justice and insists upon his selfish aim.

FALSE CHALLENGE

The delay in the conclusion of the Arms Conference is not due to the Japanese delegates, though some of the American papers make accusation that the attitude of the Japanese delegates is the cause of it.

This accusation is not well founded. It is hitching the cart before the horse. If the American delegates had accepted the Japanese modification in the ratio, it would have ended long ago. At the opening of the Conference, Japan made a con-

ditional acceptance with a definite reservation for the modification in tonnage. The American delegates approved the Japanese position on the matter. They should have accepted Japan's proposal for 70 per cent at once, according to international comity.

If the United States desires more controversy, she should be consistent and just. This is not an occasion for time-worn trickery in diplomacy. The United States should be reminded of President Harding's opening address to the Conference in which he said, "Let understanding rule and make good will regnant everywhere."

IV

The Four Power Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations

The Article II of the Four Power Pact provides: "To arrive at an understanding as to the *most efficient measures*." This provision is exactly analogous in its meaning to articles X and XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations. If the United States ratifies the Pact, she should also ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations, for both are practically the same. If the United States does not ratify the Covenant of the League after she has ratified the Pact, this would be ignoring logic and denying justice.

But what do they mean by the phrases "said rights" and "any other power" in Article II? "Any other power" could only be construed as applying to a non-signatory power. The term "said rights" means the rights concerning the Pacific Islands. What nation can be aggressive since the old landlord—Germany—has retired quietly into a corner of Europe? What power, other than one of the High Contracting Parties could be such aggressive one? It is absolutely impossible for such a nation to come into existence in the next ten years. Therefore, what could Article II mean and what could be its object? The article is as deceptive as a dinner without guest or food.

The second paragraph of Article I does not settle the matter legally or economically, as intended originally in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Therefore it becomes only an empty procedure of the Conference demanding answer as to its meaning. This Pact is the same as a blank sheet. It does not mean anything. To add some meaning will be deceptive to the world!

This pact has slaughtered mercilessly the old and faithful sentinel of peace known as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This was frankly admitted by Mr. Edward Lowry in the *Washington Post*. (See Appendix 11.)

V

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND ITS SERVICE TO HUMANITY

The purpose of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is to maintain peace and order in the Far East. It has been serving its sole purpose as a sentinel of peace. To abandon the Alliance means to destroy it. The Japanese are not warlike. Why should they kill the sentinel of peace?

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance actually exists and shall continue to be so forever. It does not terminate in June, 1922 as it is clearly stated in a clause of the Treaty.

In England, public opinion now supports its continuance. Mr. Lloyd George together with the House of Commons approves it. The delegate from New Zealand is also an advocate for it. The existence of the Alliance cannot be terminated merely by the opinion of an editor of the London Times. The sentinel of peace will not be pierced through with the pen point however sharp and fierce it might be.

Beware, Oh America! the Anglo-Japanese Alliance stands for peace. This sentinel is facing the continent of Asia, never toward America. This faithful sentinel cannot and will not point his dagger behind him.

(An English journalist—Mr. Steed—states his opinion saying that there is no need for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This is the answer to it.)

THE TEST OF ANGLO-JAPANESE FRIENDSHIP

An English journalist says:

"Japan has acted contrary to the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; just as she has used her position as successor to Germany in Shantung to overstep the legitimate implications of that position." (*Washington Post*, Dec. 2, 1921.)

The Japanese entry into the Great War was dictated by a sense of international morality. From the legal interpretation of the treaty, Japan was not necessitated in going into the war. The magazines which were published in August and September of 1914 are full of this account expressed by the eminent Japanese jurists.

In spite of this the Japanese statesmen took the spirit of the treaty rather than the legal aspect of it and joined the war. This was due to the high sense of international obligation and morality.

There is no excuse for a critic of international affairs who makes blunders because of his inability to read the language of the country that he is criticising. To write without knowing the real state of affairs is like firing a gun without aiming at a target.

Japan, as she often declared, is going to give Chingtao to China. Yes, Japan is making an offering to China of the fruit of war which cost Japan many lives and blood. "Japan to succeed Germany" is the exposure of utter ignorance of the state of affairs in the Far East. (Japan is not repeating what England did to Egypt. One should not confuse the cases.)

One who shuts his eyes and ears and opens his mouth only before the public makes no orator or musician of himself. Such a display is harmful to England. It is like spreading poison gases, and not a good instrument of attack for civilized people.

The friendship between England and Japan is firm and secure. It stood the greatest test during the late Great War and shall prove to be more secure and firm in years to come.

EVOLUTIONIST OR MILITARIST?

(Answer to Mr. Steed, editor of *London Times*)

England wants to establish a new protectorate over Meso-

potamia. Is it a move of militarists or evolutionists? If it is the desire of evolutionists, then the Japanese 21 demands on China in 1915 were also handled by the evolutionists.

The ratio 5-5-3 is an arbitrary decision reached by the Americans and English themselves. It is well understood by the Japanese that it is very convenient for the United States to have it. Japan wants to reach a conclusion voluntarily as the United States and England came to a mutual understanding. As you well know, Japan accepted the American proposal with a definite reservation from the beginning, that she wanted to modify in tonnage. This point is clear in the reports of the Conference by the papers.

It must be remembered that to force any measure is the policy of militarists. If you wish to criticize the action of militarists you can find a good example here in Washington. You do not need to waste your time in trying to review the ancient history where the Japanese 21 demands belong, even though they were handled by "evolutionists" of Japan.

(This is the answer to an article by Mr. Steed published in the Washington Post. The article criticised the Japanese attitude since the last great war. See Appendix, No. 8.)

VI

The Chemical Warfare Question

ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN MILITARISTS ON CHEMICAL WARFARE

In their famous work entitled "Chemical Warfare," General Amos A. Fries and Major Clarence J. West of the U. S. A., state the American approval for the unrestricted use of poisonous gas in war. They say: "How much better it is to say to the world that we are going to use chemical warfare to the greatest extent possible in any future struggle" (p. 439).

The justification for the previous statement is as follows: "Accordingly, chemical warfare is an agency that must not only be reckoned with by every civilized nation in the future,

but is one which civilized nations should not hesitate to use. When properly safeguarded with masks and other safety devices, it gives to the most scientific and most ingenious people a great advantage over the less scientific and less ingenious. Then why should the United States or any other highly civilized country consider giving up chemical warfare? To say that its use against savages is not a fair method of fighting, because the savages are not equipped with it, is arrant nonsense. No nation considers such things to-day. If they had, all American troops, when fighting the Moros in the Philippine Islands, would have had to wear the breech-clout and use only swords and spears" (same book p. 438).

The above explanation can be summarized: "Americans have better advantages whenever they use this poisonous gas in fighting against the uncivilized nations." It is not clear whether poisonous gas should be used in warfare among the equally civilized countries or not. Or does it mean really that the present advanced powers such as England, France, Italy, Japan, Germany and others are still uncivilized? In other words, does it mean that the United States is the only country that has achieved the highest progress in scientific investigations?

The Americans may not be so conceited as to assume themselves to be the superiors of all other nations. It seems certainly unreasonable; for England and France are still recognized to be the leaders of the Western civilization. Else, it means the United States is advocating the use of gas against only the natives of uncivilized races such as the Philippinoes, as has been referred to. If so we should not allow it for the sake of humanity. Suppose the natives of the Philippines hear this statement that the Americans dare use the crudest means of warfare in fighting against them, what would they think about the Americans? I wish to know their opinion about it.

To treat the natives of uncivilized countries humanely is the accepted principle of international conventions (such as the Treaty of Berlin concerning the Congo Free State and the Covenant of the League of Nations); and it is also the moral duty of the civilized nations. Is the United States regarding these international treaties merely "scraps of paper"? If so, the entrance of the United States into the late Great War

because of Germany's unrestricted submarine campaign and other inhumane practices, means nothing. No; surely the United States is not following in the footsteps of the old German Empire.

Now let us consider for a while warfare between the civilized nations. The principles of international law can be applied only to civilized peoples. Any one who is familiar with international law knows that the term "civilized country" does not merely mean those countries which can invent poisonous gas or those which have made the most experiments in the matter.

If any nation applies deadly gases without restriction in warfare, the result will be entirely contrary to the view of the authors of the book. It is clear that the loss will be severe and fearful on both sides and not limited to one side only.

Primarily, poisonous gas merely aims at killing as many combatants as possible. No one can deny that the use of gas is purely a killing device. It is quite different in nature from other kinds of war instruments. But among the civilized nations the object of war is to weaken the enemy force and not primarily to kill. If so, the use of poisonous gas should be out of consideration in the warfare of civilized countries. It is clear then, poisonous gas has no place in warfare among the civilized nations; especially so, when it is not advantageous for one of the belligerents only as the authors stated. They might assume that poisonous gas is the best for offense as well. It is unreasonable to suppose that when both sides use it the result will be such that the offensive side will not suffer. Any poisonous gas strong enough to kill human beings ought to be effective upon defensive as well as offensive.

If the Americans have invented such a device that when applied by Americans in defence, it destroys the lives of offensive forces only, they ought to be congratulated for that achievement.

There is something lacking in logic in what the authors claim. This lack of logic naturally causes misunderstanding.

The Americans have a duty to make it clear to the world, for it is not at present a merely empty theory of international law. It is a fact that because of this deadly gas used by the Germans in the late Great War, England, France, Italy, Bel-

gium and other countries experienced great suffering and from that experience they are uniting in prohibiting this instrument of war. Japan, too, believing this to be right is with the rest of the world to prohibit this weapon in future wars. In March, 1921, the International Red Cross Conference adopted a resolution against the use of deadly gas in warfare.

We appeal for reason and stand for accepted theory and practice of international law. The Regulation respecting "the Laws and Customs of War on Land," which was passed in 1907 at the Hague Peace Conference states, in Article 22: "The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unrestricted."

If the United States alone, as Germany in the late War, regards the treaties as merely "scraps of paper" the United States must make it known to the world what she is standing for. If, on the one hand, the United States preaches the gospel of peace and justice and endeavors to bring nations together by agreement to eliminate the evils of war and the possibilities of war, then she ought to be consistent with that ideal. If, on the other hand, she does not consider the treaties or accepted theory of international law as binding, the other nations should understand the United States as to such matters, and prepare accordingly. This means the Washington Conference is merely mockery.

The United States as a whole, is not well informed about this subject. We believe that those who are advocating the unrestricted use of gases in future wars are those who belong to the old German school. If the public commences to study this matter carefully, the United States—the home of justice—too, will join her voice in the public opinion of the world and march along the path of humanity with the rest of the world to prohibit the use of poisonous gases for war.

NOTE: The American members of the sub-committee on the poison gas question were firmly for the unrestricted use of poison gases, while the Japanese members were the first to oppose that view. Fortunately the public opinion of the United States showed itself in a vigorous attack on the American viewpoint and finally won the case. This triumph of reasonable opinion ought to be cause for congratulation for the sake of humanity.

THE VIEW OF THE JAPANESE DELEGATION RELATING TO THE USE OF POISON GASES

The Japanese delegation proposes an entire prohibition of the use of poison gases in future warfare—in view of the growing calamity to be caused to humanity consequent to the development of chemical science as applied for warfare purposes in the future.

Although some may take the view that the effects of poison gases are not so disastrous as those caused by other modern weapons, it should be observed that the extent of ravages to be wrought by poison gases in the future is almost beyond imagination. Not only is this inexcusable from a humanitarian point of view, but their use runs counter to the real object of modern war which aims to weaken the enemy force but not to kill.

For this reason, we would propose that the Committee should conduct investigations, (1) from the standpoint of the rules of warfare, (2) the restraint measures to be applied to the country that disregards the agreement governing the use of poison gases, (3) the control over researches into and the manufacture of poison gases in time of peace.

VII

The Illegality of the Neutrality of China

The Washington Conference passed a resolution concerning the neutrality of China, the account of which was given in the *New York World* (Dec. 8). It said: "The Conference then voted a resolution declaring China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in future war to which she is not a part."

The above resolution is invalid because: (1) it is against the Covenant of the League of Nations; (2) it is against the Russo-Japanese Treaty of June, 1916. The Covenant of the League of Nations states: "They will mutually support one another in resisting any special measure aimed at one of their members by the Covenant breaking state, and they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their terri-

tory to the forces of any of the members of the League which are co-operating to protect the Covenant of the League of Nations."

According to the provision above, China has no right to become simply and unconditionally neutralized. She has the obligation to observe the Covenant. China has her duty to co-operate with her allies or members of the League in the time of war. She has no right to become neutralized. This resolution is not legal. Both China and the other seven Powers which took part in adopting the Resolution did not follow procedure legally. The Covenant is not a "scrap of paper." America has no right to recognize any illegal action in the Conference.

In the Russo-Japanese Treaty of July 31, 1916, Art. 11 states:

"In the event that the territorial rights or special interests, in the Far East, of one of the contracting parties, recognized by the other contracting party, should be menaced, Japan and Russia will confer in regard to the measures to be taken with a view to the support or co-operation to be given each other in order to safeguard and defend those rights and interests."

According to this treaty, Japan has no right to decide any matter concerning Manchuria without the consent of Russia. The Japanese delegates have no right to agree on the neutralization, for the Russo-Japanese Treaty has never been abrogated. The Japanese people have no right to approve this resolution. The resolution on the neutrality of China menaces the interests in Manchuria of both the Japanese and Russian nations.

The Resolution is null from the legal point of view.

VIII

The Washington Conference and the Panama Canal Zone

At the Pacific Conference, to limit the discussions on leased territories to China, is not complete. The United States has leased territory on the Pacific—the Panama Canal Zone. This

territory, too, ought to come under the discussions. England, France and the United States acquired their leased territories by points of pen and tactful language. To give up these territories by point of pen and flowery language is not a hard task.

The United States should give up the Panama canal Zone. England's Wei Hei Wei and France's Kwang Chow Wan should also be given up. Then, Japan will present to China the port of Tsing Tao—now a Japanese territory (German Gebiet) taken by the Japanese force with consent of the Allied Powers and recognized by the Versailles peace treaty signed by the most civilized nations of the world. That would be the only impartial view on the matter.

The United States stands for justice and fair play. She should practice what she preaches. Before England, France and Japan sacrifice themselves on the Pacific deal, the United States ought to lead the move, since President Harding said in the opening address before the Conference: "The United States welcomes you with unselfish hands."

IX

The Washington Conference and Bernhardism

There was an article concerning the resolution passed by the Committee on the Limitation of Armament which appeared in the papers of December 6, and it stated as follows: "Possibilities of increased effectiveness in submarine and aviation equipment and intimations of other destructive mechanisms and sinister chemical discoveries capable of dealing death en masse have brought the members of the sub-committee, it is said, to the conviction that it would be vain for them to draw detailed regulations for future fighting as they could not make such rules sufficiently complete to include possibilities of the future and that to try to do so would mean that any power wishing to violate the rules would be able to find a way through this necessary inadequacy."

If this opinion had been expressed by the old Prussian militarists, there would be no surprise about it, but when one learns this was the opinion of eminent representatives of leading nations—England, the United States, France, Italy, we cannot but feel sad about this sudden change in attitude toward this important question since the Great War.

If it would be vain to draw any code of law for the future, what was the aim of the Napoleonic Code? Was it to maintain national order only under the reign of Louis XVI? No. Any legal code aims primarily to regulate law-breakers of the future.

It would be absurd to say that “any power wishing to violate the rules would be able to find a way through this necessary inadequacy”; for there would be no use in legislating municipal as well as international law until human beings become God himself (not as Adams and Eves).

From the standpoint of the Committee it would be impossible to realize a present day political system such as to operate judiciary, legislative and executive departments following the principle of the separation of powers. The judiciary function is necessary because there are people who disturb public peace and order. If they cannot make laws because there are law-breakers, then, it is equivalent to the logical destruction of the present political constitution.

The members of the sub-committee of the Washington Conference are not so sincere and responsible as those of the Hague Conference of 1907. They are insulters of the present good order. Yes, they are really disciples of Bernhardi—the promoter of the last Great War!

The atmosphere of the Washington Conference is militaristic. This is true of the representatives of the United States who have been dictatorial from the start, and the others, except a certain one, do not object to it; for they, too, are militaristic. It was an utterly mistaken idea to suppose that the Washington Conference was for the purpose of a better order of international society but the fact points contrary to President Harding's speech at the opening of the Conference. What are the peace-loving Americans thinking about it?

X

The Naval Holiday a Joke

The Ten-year Naval Holiday is a joke. It applies to Japan only. Japan retains the Mutsu, which was actually completed during November. The United States and England are each constructing in ten years two big capital warships. The high aim of the American delegation—the ten years' holiday—was defeated by the American and British delegates themselves by trading one ship already completed for four ships to be constructed throughout many years—as long as they wish—and to construct them with the most improved scientific equipment. What a joke!

XI

Root's Four Points and Their Absurdity

What does the Root Resolution mean? The Anglo-Japanese Alliance contained a provision that the Resolution proposed. If the Powers respect the sovereignty for China why do they not respect all the treaties concluded by her with her full sovereignty? The matter of leased territory belongs to the scope of the treaty stipulated by China as a sovereign State. Then, what is meant by "returning leased territory" by request of China? It is quite nonsense.

Is the United States going to stand aside as a spectator when there occurs some threatening disturbance in Chinese internal affairs? Is this not too unkind for unfortunate people?

The English subjects, for good reasons, cannot be driven from the Chinese tariff administration. For similar reasons the postal system of China cannot dispense with the Frenchmen. Then, what do they mean by the maintenance of integrity of administration?

Article IV of the Root Resolution reads: "To restrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

Why, then, do the Americans endeavor to deprive Japan of her rights and interests in China by countenancing action inimical to the security of Japan such as would forfeit her territorial rights in leased territory or railway rights in Shantung? What does the Root Resolution mean?

XII

The "Open Diplomacy" of the American Delegates

There is a prevalent belief that the Hughes proposal on the naval limitation was an epoch making event in open diplomacy.

The naval proposal and its method of presentation was merely the method of display of American politics; but when one studies the real processes of American diplomacy one cannot deny the fact that the American delegates preserved more secrecy in the Conference than other nations have done. This point can be illustrated by the following quotations:

SIDE LIGHTS ON THE CONFERENCE

(From The Washington Evening Star—Dec. 12)

The Washington conference does most of its work in committee meetings, behind closed doors, in the governors' room in the Pan-American building. The major committees on the limitation of armaments and on the Far East meet there. Stenographers are tabooed at these committee meetings.

U. S. ONLY DELEGATION WITHOUT PRESS AGENT

(From the Philadelphia Inquirer—Nov. 19)

Special to The Inquirer.

Washington, Nov. 18—With talk of full publicity and open diplomacy still floating around it has been developed at the International Conference on Limitation of Armaments that America is the only nation participating in the parley which is without a direct link connecting its delegation and the press. Secretary Hughes, the only authorized spokesman, is silent because of his chairmanship and no other plans have been developed for furnishing information on plans and accomplishments of the United States envoys.

All other nations represented have large and active press bureaus at which not only is information on future plans available, but technical explanation of various points involved are given by the experts.

Besides, one will note a great contrast in the volume of publication of the details of debates between the questions of

capital-ship ratio and the limitation of submarines. In the former the United States did not want the public to know the details, point by point, as discussed by experts of America and Japan; for it was disadvantageous to allow the influence of public opinion on that particular subject. But when they came to the submarine question, the United States and England allowed full discussion in the papers; for they wanted to have a public sentiment with the movement.

The above generalization can be strengthened when one studies the amount of publication on the poison gas question. The United States was standing on the proposal for unlimited use of gas; but when she was defeated in the sub-committee meetings, the papers quoted the resolution passed by a certain organization. This was to give the credit to public opinion rather than to the members of the committee from other nations. These facts prove that the delegates of the United States are not standing for open diplomacy as they declared in the opening of the Conference.

XIII

No Pan-Asiatic Doctrine

(*To Mr. Edward G. Lowry*)

Your article appearing in the *Washington Post* of December 25, 1921* is the proof (sorry to say so) of your ignorance of the Japanese language; consequently, it appears ridiculous to one who knows the situation.

If the Japanese statesmen are as tactful as you suppose, the people of Japan would not be so indignant. They are overwhelmed by the combined force of the British and the American dictators.

You refer to "a school of thought" which "has embraced the pan-Asiatic doctrine." I wish to know who belong to that school. To my knowledge it is a baseless accusation. The combination of the Asiatics throughout the Asiatic Continent including Turkey is utter nonsense. Even a child would not dream of such a thing, for the British, French and Russian foothold is too strong in the Asiatic Continent.

*See Appendix, No. 11.

If you wish to know Japan you should study the Japanese language. It is impossible to understand the real state of affairs going on in Japan, through English language only. Many of the writers give misconception to the American public for they have no linguistic foundation to understand the nation of the Rising Sun. The responsibility of good understanding is on your shoulders. Misunderstanding is the enemy of Peace!

XIV

Agreement and Threat

American papers in general have a common habit of threatening other nations when they do not yield to the American viewpoint. One frequently reads such passages as the following in the daily papers: "The responsibility for failure of the Conference rests on those nations who do not obey American proposals. Japan [afterward France] is responsible for it."

The above is a mere threat. The Japanese people were threatened and yielded to the United States' demand. France yielded to the capital-ship ratio but she reasonably insisted on her equality on auxiliary and submarine tonnage and succeeded in her just insistence.*

The Japanese nation was too generous and she was treated as if she were a nation which was defeated in war. This insult will not be forgotten by the people of Japan. We, the Japanese, are very sorry of this very unpleasant memory of the Conference.

XV

Leased Territory and Misunderstanding of the United States

The legal meaning of leased territory is clearly understood by the English, French, German and Japanese jurists but

*See Appendix, No. 10.

this apparently has not been clearly presented to the American reader.

Leased territory (*cession a bail*) is not a rented territory in civil law; but it is transferred territory with absolute power, from one state to another. In the Chinese terminology it means "transfer of land in name of lease." For the technical meaning one should consult treatises by eminent international lawyers: Westlake or Lawrence (English); Bonfilis or Peran-Jacquet (French); Kobner (German), or Ninagama (Japanese).

The German-Chinese treaty on the leased territory of Tsingtao states, "If Germany should give Tsingtao back to China, she should give some other similar territory to Germany." In other words, Germany had perpetual right to own Tsingtao and this was clearly stipulated in the treaty between Germany and China. Since Japan acquired the title from Germany by war and the peace treaty of Versailles, Tsingtao legally and logically belongs to Japan.

Because of the friendly spirit of Japan, as a token of friendship, Japan is presenting it back to China. Among the nations there is none but Japan which shows such generosity to China. One may ask, what did the United States give to China? Concerning the Shantung question, the *Washington Post* of January 11, 1922, refers to a speech made in the United States Senate in 1919 by President Harding (then Senator from Ohio), in which he is quoted as referring to Japan's action in the Shantung matter as "an international immorality that challenges our every utterance about lofty purpose and the reign of justice." But this can not be taken seriously for it was merely a senatorial speech. Ere this he has probably outgrown such a feeling.

The United States should study the facts about the case and proceed according to a just principle. Without doing this, to deprive the Japanese of a duly acquired right concerning Tsingtao is tyranical and undemocratic, and contrary to one of the Root four points, in which the Powers attending the Conference are pledged "To refrain . . . from countenancing action inimical to the security of such [friendly] states."

APPENDIX

| | | |
|-----|--|----|
| 1. | United States Program Worked out on Present Sea Strength (<i>Washington Post</i>) | 32 |
| 2. | Naval Accord (<i>ibid</i>) | 33 |
| 3. | Looks to Japan's Common Sense to Solve First Issue of Parley (<i>ibid</i>) | 34 |
| 4. | New Angles Prove Generosity of the United States (<i>ibid</i>) | 36 |
| 5. | American Approval of Japanese View (<i>ibid</i>) | 37 |
| 6. | Experts presented Calculations showing Nippon's Naval Power 70 per cent (<i>ibid</i>) | 38 |
| 7. | Admiral's Baron Kato's Address | 40 |
| 8. | Pact with Japan Worse than Futile, Steed Says, (<i>Washington Post</i>) | 41 |
| 9. | Policy vs. Principle (<i>Washington Evening Star</i>) | 42 |
| 10. | French Resenting Dictation on Navy (<i>ibid</i>) | 42 |
| 11. | Criticism on Japanese Diplomacy by Mr. Lowry, (<i>Washington Post</i>) | 42 |
| 12. | Accusation for France (<i>The World</i>) | 43 |
| 13. | Denby Wants Navy Equal of Any (<i>N. Y. Times</i>) | 44 |
| 14. | The Text of the Four Power Pact | 45 |
| 15. | Root's Four Points | 46 |
| 16. | President Harding's Arms Address | 46 |

APPENDIX

1

PRESENT SEA STRENGTH

By Albert W. Fox

(From The Washington Post)

Although the Washington conference is proceeding full-steam ahead, with definite programs for naval armament limitation and for the Pacific and Far Eastern problem already accepted as bases of discussion, there appeared yesterday the first indication of a possible serious obstacle to the hoped-for harmony of views and progress. It develops that the statement by Admiral Baron Kato, head of the Japanese delegation, that Japan desires to maintain a proportion in naval tonnage "slightly greater than sixty per cent" of the British and American tonnage has caused some concern to the American delegation and to at least some of the British representatives here who believed that the question of relative tonnage had been automatically settled when Japan announced acceptance in principle of the American proposals.

Japan's Stand Stirs

It cannot be denied that the Japanese statement has not been received with great favor in either American or British circles. There is no disposition among any of the delegates here to doubt the sincerity of Japan's efforts to co-operate in the general plan for naval reductions, and the avowed intention of the Japanese spokesmen to see that their own national safety is guaranteed is admired and respected. But the latest suggested alteration of the American proposals is nevertheless regarded with misgivings, primarily because it appears to strike at the very basis of the program which Japan announced acceptance of in principle.

Stop Now, America's View

The fundamental principle of the American proposals is that if competition in naval armaments is going to stop, it should stop now, and that the three leading naval powers, Great Britain, the United States and Japan, should agree forthwith to cease this competition and to adjust their naval tonnage according to a program based on their relative strength as it now exists. The 60 per cent proportion given to Japan is based on existing conditions—and is not in any sense an arbitrary proportion. To guard against any possibility of unfairness, the American naval experts adopted a particularly liberal plan in stipulating 60 per cent as Japan's proportion.

There are American naval experts who declared that 60 per cent was slightly too much in view of existing naval tonnage in the British, American and Japanese navies and taking the capital fighting ship as the basis of estimating naval strength. But the matter of a slight

increase in the proportion assigned to Japan was not regarded as important.

Affects Whole Principle

The slight increase which Admiral Baron Kato now desires is likewise not regarded as particularly important in so far as this would affect any problem of naval strategy involved in the proposed reductions of the British or American navies. But the point is that it would be regarded as affecting the whole basic principle upon which the reduction program for the three navies is formulated, namely, the principle that "regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the powers concerned" in limiting naval armaments.

When Great Britain and Japan accepted the American proposals in principle they were regarded as having necessarily accepted this basic principle or feature of the whole plan. In other words, Japan said she agreed to the principle that competition in naval armaments should stop now. Obviously, if Japan proposes to ask to be allowed to increase her naval strength slightly over her present relative strength, there is no valid reason for denying Great Britain or the United States the right to ask for slight increases along one line or another.

2

BLOCK NAVAL ACCORD

(From the Washington Post)

While there was no vote taken yesterday in the subcommittee of experts, the British and American groups were in full accord that the Japanese proposal was not sound and that it constituted a question of policy, not of fact. It was this situation that ended the experts' deliberations, for they were charged only with examination of facts, not with the shaping of policies. The delegations alone may formulate these and the matter went back to them.

See Question of Policy

'For the American delegation the situation was described authoritatively as an agreement of the experts as to points of difference. These include minor questions relating to percentage of completion of ships under construction, whether battleships over 20 years old can be included in estimates of strength of modern navies and similar points. All of these, in the American view, are minor because they are questions of fact and can be resolved beyond disagreement.

The major point of difference, however, the Japanese proposal to disregard ships under construction in calculating naval strength, is viewed as a matter of policy and a suggestion that is not open to debate so far as the United States is concerned. Neither the American government nor the American people will consent, it was stated authoritatively, to scrap fifteen capital ships averaging 50 per cent complete and upon which more than \$330,000,000 has been paid out as the

equivalent of Japan's four new ships to be scrapped. The enormous sacrifice the United States government has offered to make, it was stated officially, must be reflected in the fleet ratio to be established with Japan. There was said to be no room for argument on that point.

Show Japan's Ratio Liberal

On every other possible basis of calculation considered by the experts Japan could show not even the 60 per cent ratio proposed for her in the American plan. The application of the capital ship tonnage measurement to fix the ratio itself is a wide concession to Japan, it is said. If existing auxiliary craft were included in the computation on any basis, from total naval tonnage to inclusion of any selected particular type of ships in addition to capital ships, she would have far less than a 50 per cent ratio. The United States has an overwhelming preponderance in all auxiliary craft, yet sought no advantage in the agreement from that fact, it was said.

On the highest ratio Japan could be allowed by the figures presented that include ships under construction, her ratio was 59 per cent, and to reach that she would be permitted to include two old predreadnaughts more than 20 years old, while the United States would discard all ships over 20 years old. Various tabulations were gone over by the experts and in every case Japan's ratio fell below 60 per cent.

Await Offer From Japan

To meet this condition the Japanese put forward their suggestion that only ships afloat be counted in estimating naval strength, since in that way alone their estimate of 70 per cent could be attained. Both American and British experts balked at this and a final recasting of the tabulations by the Japanese, presented yesterday, added nothing to the situation as it had already shaped itself, so the subcommittee quit to await instructions from the delegates. The head of each expert group so reported to the chief of his delegation.

Admiral Baron Kato, active leader of the Japanese delegation, refused last night to throw any light on what his group planned to do. In view of the authoritative statement from the American delegation, that the 70 per cent ratio suggestion or the Japanese proposal as to the basis for calculating capital ship strength would not be entertained, it appeared likely that compromise offers from the Japanese group were in order.

LOOKS TO JAPAN'S COMMON SENSE TO SOLVE FIRST ISSUE OF PARLEY

By Philippe Millet,
Foreign Editor, *Le Petit Parisien*.
(From the *Washington Post*)

The first difficulty encountered by the conference has now appeared with clearness. Admiral Kato has made a declaration to the press to

the effect that Japan deems it necessary to secure a proportion in capital ships and defensive ships superior to that laid down for her in the American proposals. An American communication to the press has, however, quickly made clear that these Japanese counter-proposals are in contradiction to the very principle underlying the American program, which indeed is based on maintaining the present proportion of ships between the navies concerned.

It would be a mistake not to acknowledge the complexity of this problem. On the American side the popular enthusiasm which manifested itself from the first day does not prevent the Hearst papers from waging already a campaign against a possible international agreement on disarmament, and from ironically announcing that the Hughes program is being picked to pieces by the Japanese and even the English.

Double Support Assured

However isolated such an attitude may be, it certainly gives a warning to the American administration, and must of needs determine Mr. Hughes to refuse to compromise on the principle underlying his program.

It must be noted, in this respect, that America will also resist the British amendment on submarines, as she is resisting the Japanese amendment on the question of proportions. Some say that definite pledges have been given on this point by Mr. Harding to the representatives of California, more especially to Senator Johnson. In any case, America will be supported in this matter not only by France, but by Australia.

"Mutsu" Status in Question

No protracted debate is to be feared in this direction. On the other hand, the Japanese attach a certain importance to their amendments. Their naval experts seem to have established, after taking into account in their calculations the distance which the American fleet would have to cover if it wanted to cross the Pacific, that a general proportion of 70 per cent is indispensable to insure the safety of Japan.

It is, indeed, fairly difficult to forecast what the solution will be, unless the Japanese succeed in demonstrating that the Hughes program ought to have taken into account the Japanese battleship Mutsu, which was recently launched, and which represents in itself an addition of about 30,000 tons. In this case, America might consent to raising the proportion granted to Japan without renouncing at the same time the principle of taking as a basis of naval disarmament the present strength of the fleets.

Looks to Japan's Common Sense

Finally, one must not exaggerate the importance of a difficulty which, of course, will not be the only one encountered, and which will not prevent an ultimate agreement from being framed; for Japan, in an emergency, will have enough common sense not to insist.

NEW ANGLES PROVE GENEROSITY OF U. S.

(By the Associated Press)
(From the Washington Post—Nov. 25)

Statistical reviews of the meaning of Secretary Hughes' proposal for limitation of naval armaments and immediate heavy reductions in fighting fleets, give a graphic picture that seems to bear out from every point of view the generosity of the offer the United States has made to the other naval powers.

This applies both to the proposed "5-5-3" ratio and to the retained tonnage phases of the American plan. The comparative figures also show clearly an extraordinary allowance for Japan in the scale of nations.

Equalized in 10 Years

To treat the tonnage figures of the American plan from a new angle, the "5-5-3" ratio represents the distribution of capital ship tonnage on the basis of Japan keeping a fleet representing 23 per cent of the total of the three powers, the other two dividing the remainder.

During the 10-year period, however, Great Britain would have in the neighborhood of 43 per cent; the United States would have something more than 35 per cent and Japan over 21 per cent of the total. The change at the end of the 10-year holiday represents equalization of the American and British fleets to which Great Britain already has agreed.

Under the "5-5-3" ratio and the proposed limitation of auxiliary tonnage as well as capital craft through application of the replacement rule of maximum, the British and American fleets would reach a total of 1,120,000 tons in all combat craft and Japan 672,000. This makes possible a comparison of the relation of the fleets to various factors representative of the place of each power among the nations.

Comparison for Areas

Against the simple question of geographical area of each, for instance, the limited fleets would mean for Japan more than 2,500 tons of naval strength per 1,000 square miles. The same figure for the United States would be approximately 300 tons and for the British empire between 80 and 90 tons.

Even more striking in disproportion favorable to Japan is the comparison on the basis of accepted estimates of national wealth. Japan would have something like 26,000 or 27,000 fleet tons per billion dollars in national wealth, while the American figure would be little more than 3,000 tons per billion and the British 6,000 tons per billion.

Disproportion again holds true as to foreign commerce of each power. Japan would have almost 200 tons of naval tonnage per million dollars in her import and export business over a period of years. The United States would have little more than 80 tons per million and the British between 40 and 50 tons.

Gains by Commercial Tonnage

Again, in relationship of naval to commercial tonnage of each power—and navies are built to some extent to support the commercial strength afloat of their flags, Japan would have nearly 170 tons of fighting ships per thousand tons of Japanese commercial craft. The United States would have little more than 60 tons under such tabulation and Great Britain less than 50 tons.

Admittedly these figures are of a most broad and general character, but they do bring into sharpest relief the fact that Secretary Hughes' proposals were in fact based substantially on the present naval status of each power and did not put forward logical claims to national interest and place in the world which might have been advanced to support a much higher naval ratio as compared to Japan than was actually proposed.

Emphasize Good Faith of U. S.

They served, too, to emphasize the American feeling that to make the good faith of the United States in the plan plain as a pike staff the limit of concession to Japan has been offered, and there is no reason to believe that any counter-proposal that would set Japan higher in the naval scale than the "5-5-3" ratio contemplates will be acceptable to the American delegation.

Mr. Hughes, in making the proposal, pointed out the far more extensive ship-scraping program the United States proposed for itself than for either other power. And the figures show that the United States has offered to destroy more tonnage in new ships alone than either other power has been asked to discard in both new and old vessels.

APPROVAL OF AMERICANS ON JAPANESE VIEW

(From the Washington Post—Nov. 27)

America has not arbitrarily set a ratio of 5-5-3 for the British, American and Japanese navies and indeed America would admittedly have no right to set any arbitrary ratio. It has simply been a program with two cardinal features as a means of stopping the race in battleship building or the competition in naval armaments.

First. Stop building battleships.

Second. Reduce to a point agreed upon without disturbing the ratio of naval strength which now exists between the three powers.

The present existing ratio, according to American calculations, is 5-5-3. If these calculations can be challenged as inaccurate or as properly subject to modification, there may be every right on the part of Japan to do so and accordingly ask for a change in the ratio.

**EXPERTS PRESENTED CALCULATIONS SHOWING NIPPON'S
NAVAL POWER 70 PER CENT**

(By the Associated Press)

(From the Washington Post—Dec. 5)

Examination of memoranda submitted by Japanese experts during recent conferences with American officers on the naval ratio problem shows that the Japanese seized upon the "existing strength" clause of Secretary Hughes' proposal as a basis for asserting claims to at least 70 per cent of American naval strength. The Japanese proposition was presented in three tables of comparison, in none of which was any allowance made for any ship under construction on November 11 except the Japanese battleship Mutsu, rated by the Japanese as a completed ship, and by the American experts as 98 per cent complete.

"According to any of the three calculations, the existing strength of the Japanese navy amounts to about 70 per cent of the American navy," the Japanese communication said. "This is especially so when the calculation is made on the basis of superdreadnoughts, for there it will be so high that it reaches 86 per cent."

"It is therefore the firm conviction of the Japanese experts that Japan should have at least 70 per cent of navy, compared with America's 100 per cent."

Americans Made No Reply

The American experts made no written reply. The Japanese experts were verbally informed that the United States could not discuss the question of "existing strength" of the two navies on the basis of the Japanese construction. The discussions between the experts ended at this point.

Table 1, submitted by the Japanese experts, set out a comparison based on predreadnoughts and dreadnoughts of each power. It was as follows:

| UNITED STATES | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Japanese Classification. | American Classification. |
| 33 ships | 39 ships |
| 728,390 tons | 797,135 tons |
| 100 per cent | 100 per cent |
| JAPAN | |
| Japanese Classification. | American Classification. |
| 25 ships | 24 ships |
| 550,250 tons | 549,196 tons |
| 76 per cent | 60 per cent |

Remarks: if battleships of over 20 years are eliminated in accordance with original proposal, the Japanese percentage will be 68 per cent.

In explanation of this table the Japanese attached a note saying:

"The calculation by the Japanese naval experts is that, putting a fair construction on the 'existing strength' in the proposal of Mr. Hughes, it is proper to include predreadnoughts in the existing strength."

On Dreadnought Basis

Table 2 compared naval strength on the basis of dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts. It follows:

| UNITED STATES | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Japanese Classification. | American Classification. |
| 20 ships | 18 ships |
| 532,650 tons | 500,650 tons |
| 100 per cent | 100 per cent |
| JAPAN | |
| Japanese Classification. | American Classification. |
| 13 ships | 11 ships |
| 375,020 tons | 334,700 tons |
| 70 per cent | 67 per cent |

In connection with table 2, the Japanese memorandum said:

"The calculation of the Japanese experts according to the opinion of the American experts should exclude the predreadnoughts."

Table 3 dealt only with superdreadnoughts. It showed no disagreement as to tonnage figures or number of ships included. It follows:

| United States | Japan |
|---------------|--------------|
| 12 ships | 10 ships |
| 365,000 tons | 313,300 tons |
| 100 per cent | 86 per cent |

This explanation was appended:

"The calculation, excluding all of the 12-inch gun ships is, according to the universal recognition among naval experts of all nations that such ships no longer have the capacity to stand up on the first line of battle."

Sought New Policy

Discrepancies in tonnage figures between American and Japanese calculations, as shown above, were not traced out by the Americans as none of the tables came within the scope of possible discussion under the plan as referred to the experts for examination in detail. They were taken as constituting the presentation of a new policy for the basis of the naval limitation plan and this view apparently was recognized later by Admiral Baron Kato in presenting the argument to Secretary Hughes and Arthur J. Balfour that Japan needed 70 per cent for national security.

The close scrutiny given by Japanese naval officials to all America's navy publications was brought out in the course of the experts'

discussions over the percentage of completion of ships under construction. The list supplied by the Americans showed the battleship Colorado 88 per cent finished on November 11, only 10 per cent behind the Japanese Mutsu.

Japan Found Discrepancy

The Japanese then produced percentages of completion for American ships as shown in routine progress reports issued by the naval bureau of construction and repair each month. These showed the Colorado 80 per cent finished on October 31. The Japanese asked an explanation of the apparent discrepancy. They were told that the bureau dealt only with the hull of the ship and the material ordered for the hull while the 88 per cent figure given by the experts as of November 11 included work done on the guns, engines and other equipment production of which falls to the bureau of ordnance.

Another point of discussion was the different method of figuring a ship's normal displacement, which is the tonnage figure compiled for purposes of calculation of naval relativities under the American plan.

American Practice Explained

It was explained that the standard practice of the American navy was to take the deadweight of the ship, obtained by calculation of the weight of every beam, plate or rivet used in her construction and checked at the ship's side by actual weighing of each part as it is placed in the ship. To this is added the full weight of the ammunition carried by the ship and two-thirds of the weight of her full capacity of "consumable stores" which includes fuel and food and other supplies that are used up. The resulting figure is given in all navy calculations as the ship's normal displacement and it also is the load she must carry on her speed trials.

British and Japanese naval practice is not the same as this. In their case the full weight of the ship plus an arbitrary allowance for fuel and stores, usually far less than two-thirds, is given as the normal displacement. In calculating tonnage for comparative purposes the American experts increased the tonnage of British and Japanese ships to conform to American practice, although this operated to increase the ultimate percentage to be allowed those navies as compared with that of the United States.

ADMIRAL BARON KATO'S ADDRESS

Mr. Chairman:

Japan deeply appreciates the sincerity of purpose evidenced in the plan of the American government on the limitation of armaments. She is satisfied that the proposed plan will materially relieve the nations of wasteful expenditures and cannot fail to make for the peace of the world.

She cannot remain unmoved by the high aims which have actuated the American project. Gladly accepting, therefore, the proposal in principle, Japan is ready to proceed with determination to a sweeping reduction in her naval armament.

It will universally be admitted that a nation must be provided with such armaments as are essential to its security. This requirement must be fully weighed in the examination of the plan. With this requirement in view certain modifications will be proposed with regard to the tonnage basis for replacement of the various classes of vessels. This subject should be referred to special consideration by naval experts. When such modifications are proposed I know that the American and other delegations will consider them with the same desire to meet our ideas as we have to meet theirs.

Japan has never claimed nor had any intention of claiming to have a naval establishment equal in strength to that of either the United States or the British Empire. Her existing plan will show conclusively that she had never in view preparation for offensive war.

8

PACT WITH JAPAN "WORSE THAN FUTILE," STEED SAYS

By Wickman Steed—Editor London Times

(From the Washington Post—Nov. 21)

* * * * *

Attitude Taken by Gray

On his own initiative, Sir Edward Grey then informed the Japanese government, through Baron Iouye, that in the British view and for purposes of the interpretation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the "Peace Commission Treaty" would be equivalent to the general arbitration treaty which the United States Senate had rendered inoperative.

Consequently the Anglo-Japanese alliance has not contained any anti-American implication since September, 1914.

Whether or not this fact was ever officially intimated to the United States I do not know.

Possibly the British government, then absorbed in the conduct of the war, omitted to inform the State Department. It may also have imagined that the British conviction as to the impossibility of armed hostility on the part of the British Empire against the United States, which Japan shared in 1911, was sufficiently shared by the American government to render notification superfluous.

Dispose of War Suggestions

The foregoing considerations ought to dispose of any suggestions that under the alliance the nation of the British empire could or would be called upon to fight against the United States. But American objections to the alliance are based also upon the contention that it has emboldened Japan to make encroachments on China and to put forward

her famous twenty-one demands, which she would never have done had her position not been strengthened by allied relationship with Great Britain.

This contention may or may not be valid in practice. Technically, it is incontestable that any Japanese action directed against the welfare and integrity of China is contrary to the letter and spirit of the alliance.

But it is also true that at the recent conference of the dominion and British prime ministers at London the majority did not favor the abrogation of the alliance, which, as interpreted by the lord chancellor, was held to renew itself automatically from year to year unless denounced.

POLICY VERSUS PRINCIPLE

(By the Associated Press)

(From the Washington Evening Star—Nov. 19)

Secretary Hughes and his associates of the American delegation have no intention of surrendering to the naval experts the formulation of any policies to guide American action in naval or other questions pertaining to the armament conference.

It was made plain yesterday that the function of the experts was strictly that of developing the facts. Determination of policies upon those facts is the reserved right of the civilians who make up the American delegation.

FRENCH RESENTING DICTATION ON NAVY

Contrasted to Acceptance by Great Britain and Japan of

Proposed Ratios

(Headlines)

(From the Washington Evening Star—Dec. 18)

CRITICISM ON JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

By Edward G. Lowry

(From the Washington Post—Dec. 25)

When I was a lad, one of the quaint diversions of the unfettered youth of that time was to induce a snail, by persuasion, guile or force, to come out of its shell and then drop a pinch of salt on it. The snail dissolved, leaving only a dampish spot. Only the shell remained. I have lived to see that process repeated here by the great powers sitting in solemn conclave.

One of the foreordained things about this conference was that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be terminated. It was not exactly stip-

ulated in the bond, but the British knew before they came here how our government felt about it, and so undoubtedly did the Japanese. The problem was to find a way.

The four-power treaty proves to be the answer. The primary and major purpose of this new treaty is to terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Just that, and nothing more. Indeed, one of the preliminary drafts of the treaty, I believe, carried the assertion that the present instrument "superseded" the alliance it was intended to dissolve. But this interpretation was not accepted. The treaty succeeds and terminates, but does not supersede the alliance.

That was her program and plan of action in the secret committee sessions from the beginning. She first only accepts in principle, then she begins to discuss, to chaffer and to bargain, suggesting alterations, modification, reservations, amendments, all sorts of changes. This continues until all the other powers involved in the particular proposal under negotiation have made their attitude and position clear and reached an agreement. Then the Japanese, without disclosing their final position, and without prejudice and without commitment, refer the whole matter to Tokyo with a summary of the discussion and an outline of the posture of the other participating powers and their reasons for assuming them. Then another proposal is taken up, pending a reply from Japan, and the whole process is repeated.

12

ACCUSATION FOR FRANCE

By Charles Michelson

(From the New York World)

Washington, Dec. 26.—It depends on France whether the naval agreement goes any further than the capital ship ratio or whether the whole business of submarines and other auxiliary craft is wiped off the slate to be taken up by a possible conference at some future date.

To-night the hope is being expressed that France will yield on her demand for as many submarines as the United States and England are to get and consent to a compromise, but up to date it is only a hope.

The French are saying that they expect the Cabinet meeting to be held in Paris to-morrow will simply reassert that the security of France makes the suggestion of 31,500 tons as her quota impossible of acceptance; that she needs 90,000 tons.

There is reason for the belief, however, that if the amended American proposal—cutting down our quota and that of Great Britain to 60,000 tons goes through, France must be willing to accept that figure for herself.

Outlook Not Bright

This would mean, according to British authority, that the whole problem of naval auxiliaries would be taken out of conference considera-

tion, for England would insist on an absolutely free hand in anti-submarine craft. Whatever France gets, Italy demands, and England bases her naval necessities on the aggregate of any possible Mediterranean combination. Moreover, Japan shows no sign of going below the 54,000 tons that was her portion, and the original Hughes proposals.

Take it all around things look rather squally, and nothing definite is looked for from to-morrow's session of the Committee on Naval Reductions. Instead, a rather long and perhaps bitter struggle seems to impend with the ultimate result very much in doubt.

Great Britain has apparently out-manoeuvred France and has deftly extricated herself from the position into which the Paris delegates thought they had worked her on the submarine issue. On the capital ship question, France found herself alone and had either to recede from her demand for ten 35,000-ton ships or find herself isolated. Through Briand she withdrew gracefully, but stated that this did not mean that the capital ship ratio was to be applied to submarines.

England's Just Claim

She knew that England was seeking the total abolition of submarines and saw that the issue must leave Britain opposed to all the other parties to the conference. But behind the British plea for the elimination of the undersea boats was her original suggestion of a reduction from the tonnage suggested by Hughes.

She knew she had no chance to get the submarine banned entirely, but she made her fight, and her arguments were so good that Hughes was shaken and came across with the compromise proposal that the maximum of submersibles be 60,000 instead of 90,000, which was approximately what the British aimed at in the first instance.

Balfour accepted the revised proposal enthusiastically—and so we have America and England together again, France again in the position of holding up agreements.

Responsibility on France

If it should turn out that France refuses to abate her demand and the conference has to abandon the effort for a general naval reduction, so that auxiliary craft may be built without limit, and forego the naval holiday and the reduction of taxes, it will be France that will be held responsible.

DENBY WANTS NAVY THE EQUAL OF ANY

(From the New York Times—Jan. 11)

"Our navy ought always to be the equal of any in the world," said Edwin Denby, Secretary of the Navy, at the dinner of the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce in the Hotel Commodore last night. "It is now and I think it will so remain. I earnestly hope so."

TEXT OF FOUR-POWER PACT

(Terms agreed upon December 9, 1921.)

The United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan, with a view to the preservation of the general peace, and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific ocean, have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America.

His majesty, the king of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and of the British dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India.

And for the Dominion of Canada.

For the commonwealth of Australia.

For the dominion of New Zealand.

For India.

The president of the French republic.

His majesty, the emperor of Japan.

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

1. The high contracting parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific ocean.

If there should develop between any of the high contracting parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other high contracting parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

2. If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other, the high contracting parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

3. This agreement shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the high contracting parties to terminate it upon twelve months notice.

4. This agreement shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the high contracting parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate.

ROOT'S FOUR POINTS

It is the firm intention of the Powers hereinafter mentioned attending this conference:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
 2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.
 3. To use the influence for the purpose of effectively establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
 4. To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.
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PRESIDENT'S ARMS ADDRESS

President Harding in his address of welcome to the conference on limitation of armament said:

"Mr. Secretary and Members of the Conference, Ladies and Gentlemen: It is a great and happy privilege to bid the delegates to this conference a cordial welcome to the Capital of the United States of America. It is not only a satisfaction to greet you because we were lately participants in a common cause, in which shared sacrifices and sorrows and triumphs brought our nations more closely together, but it is gratifying to address you as the spokesmen for nations whose convictions and attending actions have so much to do with the weal or woe of all mankind.

"It is not possible to overappraise the importance of such a conference. It is no unseemly boast, no disparagement of other nations which, though not represented, are held in highest respect, to declare that the conclusions of this body will have a signal influence on all human progress—on the fortunes of the world.

Says Call is World-Wide

"Here is a meeting, I can well believe, which is an earnest of the awakened conscience of twentieth century civilization. It is not a convention of remorse, nor a session of sorrow. It is not the conference of victors to define terms of settlement. Nor is it a council of nations seeking to remake humankind. It is rather a coming together, from all parts of the earth, to apply the better attributes of mankind to minimize the faults in our international relationships.

"Speaking as official sponsor for the invitation, I think I may say the call is not of the United States of America alone, it is rather the spoken word of a war-wearied world, struggling for restoration, hungering and

thirsting for better relationship; of humanity crying for relief and craving assurances of lasting peace.

Would End Misunderstanding

"It is easy to understand this world-wide aspiration. The glory of triumph, the rejoicing in achievement, the love of liberty, the devotion to country, the pangs of sorrow, the burdens of debt, the desolation of ruin—all these are appraised alike in all lands. Here in the United States we are but freshly turned from the burial of an unknown American soldier, when a nation sorrowed while paying him tribute. Whether it was spoken or not, a hundred millions of our people were summarizing the inexcusable causes, the incalculable cost, the unspeakable sacrifices, and the unutterable sorrows, and there was the ever impelling question: How can humanity justify or God forgive? Human hate demands no such toll; ambition and greed must be denied it. If misunderstanding must take the blame, then let us banish it, and let understanding rule and make good will regnant everywhere. All of us demand liberty and justice. There can not be one without the other, and they must be held the unquestioned possession of all peoples. Inherent rights are of God, and the tragedies of the world originate in their attempted denial. The world today is infringing their enjoyment by arming to defend or deny, when simple sanity calls for their recognition through common understanding.

Says War Grows More Cruel

"Out of the cataclysm of the world war came new fellowships, new convictions, new aspirations. It is ours to make the most of them. A world staggering with debt needs its burden lifted. Humanity which has been shocked by wanton destruction would minimize the agencies of that destruction. Contemplating the measureless cost of war and the continuing burden of armament, all thoughtful peoples wish for real limitation of armament and would like war outlawed. In soberest reflection the world's hundreds of millions who pay in peace and die in war wish their statesmen to turn the expenditures for destruction into means of construction aimed at a higher state for those who live and follow after.

"It is not alone that the world can not readjust itself and cast aside the excess burdens without relief from the leaders of men. War has grown progressively cruel and more destructive from the first recorded conflict to this pregnant day, and the reverse order would more become our boasted civilization.

United States' Stand Unselfish

"Gentlemen of the conference, the United States welcomes you with unselfish hands. We harbor no fears; we have no sordid ends to serve; we suspect no enemy; we contemplate or apprehend no conquest. Content with what we have, we seek nothing which is another's. We only wish to do with you that finer, nobler thing which no nation can do alone.

"We wish to sit with you at the table of international understanding and good will. In good conscience we are eager to meet you frankly, and invite and offer cooperation. The world demands a sober contemplation

of the existing order and the realization that there can be no cure without sacrifice, not by one of us, but by all of us.

Calls for "Mergence of Minds"

"I do not mean surrendered rights, or narrowed freedom, or denied aspirations, or ignored national necessities. Our republic would no more ask for these than it would give. No pride need be humbled, no nationality submerged, but I would have a mergence of minds committing all of us to less preparation for war and more enjoyment of fortunate peace.

"The higher hopes come of the spirit of our coming together. It is but just to recognize varying needs and peculiar positions. Nothing can be accomplished in disregard of national apprehensions. Rather, we should act together to remove the causes of apprehensions. This is not to be done in intrigue. Greater assurance is found in the exchanges of simple honesty and directness, among men resolved to accomplish as becomes leaders among nations, when civilization itself has come to its crucial test. .

Cost a Powerful Factor

"It is not to be challenged that government fails when the excess of its cost robs the people of the way to happiness and the opportunity to achieve. If the finer sentiments were not urging, the cold, hard facts of excessive cost and the eloquence of economics would urge us to reduce our armaments. If the concept of a better order does not appeal, then let us ponder the burden and the blight of continued competition.

"It is not to be denied that the world has swung along throughout the ages without heeding this call from the kindlier hearts of men. But the same world never before was so tragically brought to realization of the utter futility of passion's sway when reason and conscience and fellowship point a nobler way.

Meeting for Service

"I can speak officially only for our United States. Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war. Wholly free from guile, sure in our own minds that we harbor no unworthy designs, we accredit the world with the same good intent. So I welcome you, not alone in good will and high purpose, but with high faith.

"We are met for a service to mankind. In all simplicity, in all honesty and all honor, there may be written here the avowals of a world conscience refined by the consuming fires of war, and made more sensitive by the anxious aftermath. I hope for that understanding which will emphasize the guarantees of peace, and for commitments to less burdens and a better order which will tranquilize the world. In such an accomplishment there will be added glory to your flags and ours, and the rejoicing of mankind will make the transcending music of all succeeding time."